

## PINDAR, O. 2.83–90

- πολλά μοι ὑπ'  
 ἀγκῶνος ὠκέα βέλη  
 ἔνδον ἐντὶ φαρέτρας  
 85 φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν· ἐς δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἔρμανέων  
 χατίζει. σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυῶ·  
 μαθόντες δὲ λάβροι  
 παγγλωσσίᾳ κόρακες ὥς ἄκραντα γαρούετον  
 Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον·  
 ἔπεχε νῦν σκοπῶ τόξον, ἄγε θυμέ· τίνα βάλλομεν  
 90 ἐκ μαλθακᾶς αὐτε φρενὸς εὐκλέας ὁ-  
 ιστοὺς ἱέντες;<sup>1</sup>

According to the traditional interpretation of these celebrated lines, Pindar is saying here that while the wise can understand his poetry by themselves, the mass of his listeners need interpreters if they are to do so; he then goes on to contrast inferior poets, who can sing only ineffectually and only what they have learned, with the poet of natural genius, who surpasses them as the eagle surpasses the crows; and finally he returns to the subject at hand, the praise of the victorious Theron of Acragas. Sandys' Loeb translation may be taken as a representative example:

Full many a swift arrow have I beneath mine arm, within my quiver, many an arrow that is vocal to the wise; but for the crowd they need interpreters. The true poet is he who knoweth much by gift of nature, but they that have only learnt the lore of song, and are turbulent and intemperate of tongue, like a pair of crows, chatter in vain against the god-like bird of Zeus.

Now, bend thy bow toward the mark! tell me, my soul, whom are we essaying to hit, while we now shoot forth our shafts of fame from the quiver of a friendly heart?<sup>2</sup>

Construed in this way, this passage has always been especially popular with scholars and with other readers – not surprisingly, for the former could find in it a justification for their activity as ἑρμηνεῖς, while the latter could pride themselves on belonging to the συνετοί. According to the scholia, it was Aristarchus himself who founded this line of interpretation:

ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος οὕτω· διάδηλά φησιν ὁ Πίνδαρος τοῖς συνετοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγόμενα ἑρμηνεύς χρῆζειν τοῦ σαφηνίζοντος αὐτὰ, ὥς οὐ πᾶσι καταδήλως φράζων· ὥστε τοῖς μὲν σοφοῖς σοφὰ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔκθεσμα, τοῖς δὲ ἰδιώταις μὴ καταδέηλα γίνεσθαι. (ad O. 2.152c)

Further details of such a reading are provided by other scholia on this passage, which gloss ἐς τὸ πᾶν as εἰς τὸ κοινὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ χυδαιοτέρους (ad 153a)

<sup>1</sup> Here and hereafter I cite the text of B. Snell – H. Maehler, ed., *Pindarus. Pars I: Epinicia. Pars II: Fragmenta, Indices* (Leipzig, 1971,<sup>5</sup> 1975<sup>4</sup>), but I have not hesitated to prefer to it on occasion the reading of the manuscripts. For example, at line 87, our uncertainty about the referent of the transmitted dual γαρούετον is not sufficient reason to adopt Bergk's conjecture of the dubious form γαρύετων. The dual may denote Bacchylides and Simonides after all, as some of the scholia guess (A. B. Drachmann, ed., *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* [Leipzig, 1903–27], ad O. 2.154b, 157a, 158c, d; cited hereafter from this edition, by lemma number or by volume, page, and line), or it may be simply deprecatory (so Basil L. Gildersleeve, ed., *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes*<sup>2</sup> [New York, 1890], 152–3 ad loc.) or part of the image (so G. M. Kirkwood, 'Pindar's ravens. *Olymp.* II, 87,' *CQ* 31 [1981], 240–3).

<sup>2</sup> John Sandys, ed., *The Odes of Pindar. Including the Principal Fragments*<sup>3</sup> (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1968), 27.

and specify the difficulty of Pindar's poetry as being due to his use of *πολλή ἱστορία, σχήματα ἐξηλλαγμένα, φράσις ποικίλη*, and *ὑπερβατὰ πολλὰ* (ad 153b).<sup>3</sup> Who could face such a forbiddingly obscurantist arsenal without professional help? The professors were not slow to take the cue: these lines are among the Pindaric texts most frequently cited by grammarians and rhetoricians throughout all of antiquity, in the Byzantine as well as in the Classical period;<sup>4</sup> Eustathius, for example, who seems to have been particularly fond of this passage, refers to it at least six times.<sup>5</sup> Three characteristic examples will serve to indicate that its popularity has not diminished in modern times. Thomas Gray chose lines 85–6 (*φωνᾶντα...χατίζει*) as the epigraph for his designedly enigmatic 'The Progress of Poesy. A Pindaric Ode';<sup>6</sup> while, in our own century, this passage was cited by Werner Jaeger as evidence for his claim that 'Wissen findet er [scil. Pindar] nur bei den Edlen, insofern ist seine Dichtung im tiefsten Sinne esoterisch',<sup>7</sup> and by Wilhelm Schmid, with the comment, 'Daß er des Deuters bedürfe, sagt er selbst', at the opening of a standard doxography on Pindar's obscurity.<sup>8</sup>

Hence it is all the more ironic that this interpretation of the passage as praising the acuity of those who understand Pindar and expressing contempt for those who do not is itself almost certainly a serious misunderstanding of these lines. Over the years, it has been attacked from a number of different directions, most recently in an important article by William Race.<sup>9</sup> But since Race's own solution is unpersuasive, and since what I take to be the correct interpretation of the passage has been approximated only thrice (by Heyne<sup>10</sup> in the eighteenth century, and by Gundert<sup>11</sup> and Perosa<sup>12</sup> in the twentieth), and in all three cases was simply asserted rather than fully argued, so that it has not found the acceptance it deserves, it may be worth examining the passage again.

The traditional interpretation suffers from at least two critical flaws: (1) *ἐς τὸ πᾶν* cannot be made to bear the sense thereby required of it, and (2) two contrasts are thereby created, one between two kinds of audiences and the other between two kinds of poets, without its being established what the relationship is between them.

<sup>3</sup> These are presumably not further quotations from Aristarchus' own note, but rather later elaborations upon his view by other scholars. Cf. also Eugenius Abel, *Scholia Recentia in Pindari Epinicia. Volumen Prius: Scholia in Olympia et Pythia* (Budapest and Berlin, 1891), p. 128, 1.14 ad O. 2.153.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the apparatus of parallels *ad loc.* in A. Turyn, ed., *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* (Oxford, 1952), and e.g. J. van Leeuwen, *Pindarus Tweede Olympische Ode* (Assen, 1964), ii.503f. n. 27.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Eustathius ad *Il.* 21.316 (1237.60); ad *Od.* 1.155 (1404.22); *prooem. Pind.* 3 (3.287.3 Dr.), 10 (289.21 Dr.), 22 (295.15 Dr.); ad Dionys. *Perieg.* 207.15 Müller.

<sup>6</sup> Roger Lonsdale, ed., *Thomas Gray and William Collins. Poetical Works* (Oxford, 1977), 46. Cf. the 'Advertisement' Gray added, together with numerous explanatory notes, to the second edition of the poem: 'When the Author first published this and the following Ode, he was advised, even by his Friends, to subjoin some few explanatory Notes: but had too much respect for the understanding of his Readers to take that liberty.' (*ibid.*)

<sup>7</sup> Werner Jaeger, *Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1934), i. 288. Jaeger himself translates *ἐς τὸ πᾶν* as 'immer' (289), but otherwise adheres to the traditional interpretation.

<sup>8</sup> Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Erster Teil: Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur, von Wilhelm Schmid. Erster Band: Die griechische Literatur vor der Attischen Hegemonie* = Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 7.1.1 (Munich, 1929), 605–6.

<sup>9</sup> William H. Race, 'The end of *Olympia* 2: Pindar and the *vulgar*', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 12 (1979), 251–67.

<sup>10</sup> C. G. Heyne, ed., *Pindari Carmina* (Göttingen, 1798), i.40 ad 153.

<sup>11</sup> Hermann Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Tübingen, 1935), 55 and 131 n. 251.

<sup>12</sup> A. Perosa, 'La Seconda Ode Olimpica di Pindaro', *SIFC* 18 (1941), 25–53, here 51–2.

To begin with the former objection: no parallel has ever been adduced to support the claim that ἔς τὸ πᾶν might mean 'for the crowd, for the masses'. 'All' is not the same as 'many'; no evidence has been found in favour of this interpretation of either the pronoun or the neuter gender.<sup>13</sup> Most of the scholars who advocate this reading recognise the difficulty, but seem prepared to accept the anomaly.<sup>14</sup> For example, Farnell writes, 'ἔς δὲ τὸ πᾶν: we must interpret in this context as "for the general," "for the crowd"; but this use of τὸ πᾶν = οἱ πολλοί occurs nowhere else'.<sup>15</sup> Of course, this kind of argument is scarcely compelling, for it fails to explain what the nature of the obligation is that requires us here to disregard the evidence of Greek usage elsewhere. Others have acknowledged the untenability of this translation of the phrase in question, but have drawn from this fact the conclusion that the reading of the manuscripts must therefore be corrupt.<sup>16</sup> Many of the arguments these scholars have deployed against the traditional interpretation are acute;<sup>17</sup> but none of the conjectures proposed – Hartung's ἄσκοπα μὲν, Oelschlaeger's ἔς δὲ μέσον, Verrall's ἔς δὲ τοπᾶν (a Doric accusative of the non-existent τοπή), and Schwickert's ἔς δ' ἄπορον – is at all persuasive. Surely it would be preferable first of all to experiment fully with other ways of understanding ἔς τὸ πᾶν before resorting to emending it away.

One alternative, reported in the scholia, is to take τὸ πᾶν as the totality of the things Pindar has which he could talk about if he chose to:

τινὲς δὲ ὅτι πολλὰ ἔχων λέγειν, εἰς τὸ πάντα εἰπεῖν καὶ διατίθεσθαι προσδεῖται ἐρμηνέων· ὡς Ὀμηρος (B488): πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε μυθήσομαι. (ad 152d, cf. ad 153c)

This interpretation, which has been adopted by a number of modern scholars,<sup>18</sup> does have the advantage of conforming to a characteristically Pindaric *topos*, viz. the

<sup>13</sup> None of the parallels offered is at all close. Thus, for example, J. Defradas, 'Sur l'interprétation de la deuxième Olympique de Pindare', *REG* 84 (1971), 131–43, here 142, acknowledges that there is no parallel for τὸ πᾶν = οἱ πολλοί, but then goes on to cite in support of the traditional interpretation Thuc. 8.93, Aesch. *PV* 235, 456, and Plato, *Laws* 875d; but in the first passage the phrase is τὸ πᾶν πληθος, in the second and third τὸ πᾶν is the direct object of a verb and means 'everything, each particular', and in the fourth ἐπὶ πᾶν is contrasted with ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ and means 'with regard to each particular instance'. οἱ πάντες at Thuc. 4.86 might seem to offer a better parallel: yet here gender and number make all the difference.

<sup>14</sup> Typical in this regard is van Leeuwen's massive commentary (op. cit. n. 4). His lengthy discussion of this passage (i.229ff.) recognises many of the difficulties of the traditional interpretation and concludes with a cautious *non liquet* (i.232); but in his translation of the passage he consistently reverts to the tradition ('maar voor de grote massa behoeven zij uitleg' i.221; 'maar de massa kan het niet stellen zonder uitleg' i.286).

<sup>15</sup> L. R. Farnell, ed., *The Works of Pindar* (London, 1930), 2.21.

<sup>16</sup> The conjectures are conveniently assembled in Douglas E. Gerber, *Emendations in Pindar 1513–1972* (Amsterdam, 1976), 36.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. particularly F. Oelschlaeger, *Aliquot Pindari loci tractantur* (Schweinfurt, 1858), 15; and J. J. Schwickert, *Kritisch-exegetische Untersuchungen zu Pindars zweitem olympischen Siegesgesange* (Trier, 1891), xxiv.

<sup>18</sup> Especially C. A. M. Fennell, ed., *Pindar. The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (London, 1893<sup>2</sup>), 36 ('for their full meaning'; in the first edition, London, 1879, 24, Fennell had proposed 'for the majority'); Race, op. cit. (n. 9); and M. Simpson, 'The chariot and the bow as metaphors for poetry in Pindar's odes', *TAPhA* 100 (1969), 437–73, here 452 ('to narrate all requires interpreters'). Others who have recently proposed non-traditional translations include Mary R. Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode: an Introduction* (Park Ridge, N.J., 1976), 137 ('in everything they yearn for interpreters'); L. Lehnus, ed. *Pindaro. Olimpiche* (Milan, 1981), 37 ('in tutto esigono interpreti'); William J. Slater, ed., *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin, 1969), s.v. πᾶς 1.a ('?on the whole'); and R. Stoneman, 'The "Theban Eagle"', *CQ* 26 (1976), 188–97, here 191 ('in general a stumbling-block and foolishness, or at least in need of good interpreters'). None of the latter makes clear exactly what his version is intended to mean.

laudatory assertion that the poet has available numerous possible sources of praise but, to avoid irrelevance, will choose now only one.<sup>19</sup> But it seems to be invalidated by the reference to *ἐρμηνεῖς*: for why should referring to the whole matter require interpreters? The paraphrase supplied by Race, the most recent defender of this line of digressing in the first place, is suspiciously tortuous:

But (δέ), when it comes to (as regards) (with a view to) the whole subject (τὸ πᾶν), the arrows (= further digression) need interpreters (= are unclear, unintelligible). Pindar has his eye on the whole subject, and fears that further elaboration of this one part will obscure the point of digressing in the first place.<sup>20</sup>

Had Pindar said that, with regard to the whole subject, further digression would be undesirable or clumsy or boring, his listeners would certainly have been able to understand him on their own; but had he said instead that, with regard to the whole subject, such digression would be obscure or unintelligible, they might well have felt the need of special interpreters to fathom his meaning. Why would further digression necessarily be obscure? It is presumably not the lack of intelligibility that would make such a digression undesirable, but rather the lack of special relevance.

The interpreters' *aporia* would be easier to comprehend if this were the only appearance of the phrase *ἐς τὸ πᾶν* in all of extant Greek literature.<sup>21</sup> Yet this is not the case. Aeschylus uses the phrase eleven times, and provides indispensable parallels for understanding this passage in Pindar. Once (*Eum.* 1044) the text is too corrupt for the syntax to be recovered;<sup>22</sup> once (*Choe.* 939) the preposition denotes the goal of the movement of a verb;<sup>23</sup> and once (*Eum.* 670) *τὸ πᾶν* governs a partitive genitive.<sup>24</sup> But in all of the other eight cases, the syntactical role of the phrase *ἐς (εἰς) τὸ πᾶν* is identical: it functions as an adverb, modifying a verb (*Eum.* 83, 291, 401, 538), an adjective (*Eum.* 52, 891), or another adverb (*Ag.* 682, *Choe.* 684). And its meaning is the same in all eight cases: it strongly affirms the word it modifies. Triclinius glosses it at *Ag.* 682b as *παντελῶς*, and there as elsewhere it is evidently equivalent to *πάντως* or *παντάπασιν*; in Latin, it would be translated as *omnino* or *prorsus*, and, in English, as 'thoroughly, completely, altogether'. Nor is this an exclusively Aeschylean idiolect: the same phrase recurs in Euripides (*Hr.* 575), modifying an adjective, and bearing exactly the same meaning.

If we allow the phrase *ἐς τὸ πᾶν* here to retain the meaning these parallels seem to enforce for it, the only word in its sentence upon which it can be made to bear is the verb *χαρίζει*. Pindar's sentence will thus be equivalent to *πάντως δὲ χαρίζει*

<sup>19</sup> Cf. especially E. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica I: The Eleventh Olympian Ode* = University of California Publications in Classical Philology 18.1 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), 8, 12ff.

<sup>20</sup> Race, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 259.

<sup>21</sup> Methodologically, parallels for *ἐς τὸ πᾶν* would obviously seem preferable in this connexion to parallels for *τὸ πᾶν*. The placement of the particle here after the preposition does not seem to be relevant to the question of whether the prepositional phrase should be read as a single semantic unit; cf. in general J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1954<sup>2</sup>), 185–6.

<sup>22</sup> Denys Page, ed., *Aeschyli Septem quae supersunt Tragoediae* (Oxford, 1972), prints the line as *σπονδαὶ δ' ἔς τὸ πᾶν ἑνδαδὲς οἰκων*† and lists in the apparatus Linwood's conjecture *εἰσόπιν*; for the many other emendations proposed, cf. R. D. Dawe, *Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus* (Leiden, 1965), 177.

<sup>23</sup> ἔλασε ἐς τὸ πᾶν ὁ . . . φηγάς, correctly glossed by the scholia *ad loc.* (Ole Langwitz Smith, ed., *Scholia Graeca in Aeschylum quae exstant omnia. Pars I. Scholia in Agamemnona Choephoros Eumenides Supplices Continens* [Leipzig, 1976], 39): ἤλασεν δὲ εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ δρόμου, ὃ ἐστὶν ἦνυσεν τὸν ἀγῶνα. ἀφίκετο, φησί, εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ ἀγῶνος. For a similar construction, cf. e.g. Thuc. 7.55.

<sup>24</sup> ὅπως γένοιτο πιστὸς εἰς τὸ πᾶν χρόνου.

έρμανέων, and will mean 'they (the arrows) certainly crave έρμηνείς'. But if so, the foundation of the traditional interpretation of this passage, namely the opposition between the few intelligent listeners (συνετοῖσιν) and the mass of unintelligent ones (τὸ πᾶν, mistakenly), immediately collapses. What, then, is the relationship between the two sentences πολλά μοι . . . συνετοῖσιν and ἐς δὲ τὸ πᾶν έρμανέων χατίζει? It may seem that this series of steps, so far from improving matters, has only made them worse: for what sense would it make for Pindar to be saying 'I have many arrows φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν, but they "completely" need interpreters'?<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, we seem to be faced by a logical problem: if his arrows do indeed speak to the wise, then why do they need έρμανείς, interpreters, at all, let alone completely? On the other, there seems to be a rhetorical one: if ἐς τὸ πᾶν does not specify part of his audience but instead emphasises the verb, why on earth should Pindar boast that his poetry *completely* needs έρμανείς, interpreters?<sup>26</sup>

Clearly, the root of the problem lies not so much in ἐς τὸ πᾶν as in έρμανείς, for it is the interpreters' commitment to translating the latter as 'interpreters' that obliges them to distort the meaning of the former. But what guarantee do we have that έρμανείς here in fact means 'interpreters'?<sup>27</sup> This is the first passage in extant Greek literature in which the word appears – all the more reason to be extremely circumspect in determining its exact meaning.<sup>28</sup> If we banish from our minds the associations that modern derivatives of the word inspire in us, and examine instead all the passages in which it occurs in fifth-century literature, we discover that, in that period, it never designates someone who performs literary interpretation or explanation, that is, someone who explains poetic utterances to the less intelligent masses. At first sight, indeed, the word seems to have a bewildering variety of meanings in this period; it is indicative that the scholia to Eur. *Andr.* 46 claim ὑπόμνησιν ἄγγελον σημείον μνημόσυνον τεκμήριον· ταῦτα σημαίνει τὸ έρμήνευμα.<sup>29</sup> But, upon closer inspection, it turns out that all the extant passages can be organised into a small number of rationally related groups once the basic meaning of the word has been grasped: it designates the agent that performs any act of translation of signification from one kind of language in which it is invisible or entirely unintelligible into another kind in which it is visible and intelligible. This general meaning is specified in fifth-century texts in five ways:

(1) The έρμηνεύς can translate from the language of gods to the language of men. As an 'expounder of divine will', he transfers a message from the realm of the gods, where its import is concealed from most men, to that of ordinary mortals, and thereby first makes it intelligible for these latter. Thus, in Sophocles, Oedipus bids Ismene έρμήνευέ μοι when she is reporting to him the new oracles concerning him she has learned of in Thebes and he requires clarification from her on one point (*OC* 398); while, in Euripides, Cassandra speaks of the 'Απόλλωνος λόγοι / . . . εἰς ἔμ' ἡρμηνευμένοι (*Tro.* 428–9). It is only a slight extension of this usage for the prophet Polyidus to refer to the divine portent itself (in this case a marine bird flying from the land to the sea) as something that would have expounded the divine message, signified the fact, ἡρμήνευσεν ἄν, that Minos' son had died at sea (Eur. *Polyidus* Fr. 636.5N),

<sup>25</sup> So Race, op. cit. (n. 9), 265 n. 7.

<sup>26</sup> This dilemma has been seen and formulated most clearly by Schwickert, op. cit. (n. 17), xxiv.

<sup>27</sup> The word is glossed by J. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Leipzig, 1883 = Hildesheim, 1961) s.v. as 'interpretes', by Slater, op. cit. (n. 18) s.v. as 'interpreter'.

<sup>28</sup> No help in this matter is to be found in Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics. Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, Ill., 1969), 12–32.

<sup>29</sup> E. Schwartz, ed., *Scholia in Euripidem* (Berlin, 1891), ii. *ad loc.*

or for the sanctuary of Thetis itself to signify Peleus' marriage with her as a *έρμηνευμα* *Νηρηῆδος γάμων* (Eur. *Andr.* 46):<sup>30</sup> in both cases the object itself in which, for the informed observer, the divine will is expressed, is referred to by the term which would otherwise designate that observer. A metaphorical usage along these lines is probably to be found at Eur. *IT* 1302, where the messenger, having been deceived as to the whereabouts of Thoas by the chorus of priestesses (1284), says that *this έρμηνεύς* (accepting Tournier's and Murray's emendation *οδε* for the transmitted *τοδε*),<sup>31</sup> presumably a knocker or a trumpet, will tell him whether Thoas is in or out. In this meaning, the word continues to be used in the fourth century, for example by Xenophon (*Cyropaed.* 1.6.2) and Plato (*Symp.* 202e3, *Pol.* 290c5; cf. *Epin.* 975c6, 984e2).

(2) Closely allied with this first usage is a rarer, secularised variant in which the realm of the divine is replaced by natural phenomena. Thus, for the enlightened author of the Hippocratic text on the sacred disease, *οὔτος* [scil. *ο έγκέφαλος*] *γάρ ημῖν έστι τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ήέρος γιγνομένων έρμηνεύς* (*De morbo sacro* 16.1); a few sentences later, he apparently glosses the participle *έρμηνεύων* with *διαγγέλλων* (16.3, cf. 16.6).<sup>32</sup> This naturalised version of the use of the term to denote the expounder of divine signification may also underlie the striking metaphor in Euripides' *Electra*, in which she expounds for her brother the message expressed by the parts of her body:

πολλοὶ δ' ἐπιστέλλουσιν, έρμηνεύς δ' ἐγώ,  
αἱ χεῖρες ἢ γλῶσσ' ἢ ταλαίπωρός τε φρήν,  
κάρα τ' ἐμὸν ξυρήκης, ὃ τ' ἐκείνον τεκών. (333–5)

(3) Another common fifth-century use of words of this group refers to the translation involved in transferring meaning from the language of silent thought to that of spoken discourse. Hesychius' gloss *έρμηνεύοντες· φράζοντες* (5948) defines lapidarily this usage of such words to designate 'expression, pronunciation', a usage given memorable expression by a fragment from Euripides' *Andromeda*, *συχᾶς· σιωπῇ δ' ἄπορος έρμηνεύς λόγων* (Fr. 126N: not 'silence is an impossible interpreter of other people's discourses', but rather 'silence is an impossible expresser of one's own discourses'). A closely related usage applies the word to the spoken pronunciation not of one's own thoughts, but of a written text: when one character in the comic playwright Philyllius' *Poleis* asks another to read something out loud, he says *ἐκ τᾶς πινακίδος δ' ἀμπερέως, ὃ τι καὶ λέγει / τὰ γράμμαθ', έρμήνευε* (Fr. 3.2 Meineke = 11.2 Kock = 11.2 Edmonds).<sup>33</sup> *έρμηνεύω* continues to be used in the fourth century to designate the spoken expression of thought, for example in Xenophon (*Memor.* 1.2.52), Thucydides (2.60.5), Plato (*Laws* 12.966b7), and Aristotle (*Soph. Elench.* 4.166b11 [= *τῇ λέξει σημαίνεσθαι*, 15]; cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 25.1435a4,

<sup>30</sup> The scholia *ad loc.* take the word to mean 'reminder' (they gloss *έρμηνεύς* as *εἰς ὑπόμνησιν ἄγει*), but such a subjectivist rendering seems out of place in the fifth century. For the secular world, from which Thetis has been absent for a very long time and to which she will return at the end of the play (1231–2), the shrine signifies the divinity of the bride and hence of her marriage: it expounds her true nature to mortal men.

<sup>31</sup> The most recent editor, J. Diggle (*Euripidis Fabulae* II [Oxford, 1981]), prints the transmitted text and consigns this striking emendation to the apparatus; but then what the messenger might mean by his reference to *έρμηνεύς* becomes quite obscure.

<sup>32</sup> The phrases in question: *ἐς δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ έγκέφαλος έστιν ὁ διαγγέλλων* [scil. *τὴν φρόνησιν*] (16.3), *διὸ φημὶ τὸν έγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν έρμηνεύοντα πρὸς τὴν σύνεσιν* (16.6, accepting Hüfmeier's conjectural *πρός*).

<sup>33</sup> So Kock; the manuscripts of Pollux, who cites this fragment, offer *ἐς τὰς πινακίδας διαμπερέως, ὅτι κἂν λέγοι / τὰ γράμματα έρμηνεύς*.

36.1441b22). Derived from this usage is another closely related one, in which the word designates style in expression: it is only when one verbalises one's thought that one finds that that thought can be expressed in different ways; but the difference between these various modes of expression is nothing other than the difference between various styles. The earliest example of this usage appears in Euripides:

ἀπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφν  
 κοῦ ποικίλων δεῖ τᾶνδιχ' ἑρμηνεμάτων.  
 ἔχει γὰρ αὐτὰ καιρόν· ὁ δ' ἄδικος λόγος  
 νοσῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φαρμάκων δεῖται σοφῶν. (*Phoen.* 469–72)

The parallel established here between ποικίλα ἑρμηνεύματα and σοφὰ φάρμακα is telling: the former phrase clearly designates fancy expressions, a highly rhetorical and sophisticated style which is laid upon the surface of the content like make-up upon an unhealthy countenance.<sup>34</sup> It is the derivative ἑρμηνεία that eventually becomes the specialised word for denoting style in this sense, as already in Diogenes of Apollonia (66b1 D–K), then in fourth-century authors like Aristotle (*Topica* Z.1.139b13–14, *Poetics* 6.1450b14); but it also retains the more general meaning of expression of thought, as in Democritus (68b5 D–K) and in later authors like Xenophon (*Memor.* 4.3.12) and Aristotle (*De part. animal.* 2.17.660a35).<sup>35</sup>

(4) Another activity in which meaning is transferred from one language in which it is inaccessible to another in which it is available is that to which we usually refer when we speak of 'translating': mediating from the language of one nation to that of another. The earliest example of this usage occurs in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: when Cassandra fails to respond to Clytemnestra's command that she enter the palace, the queen assumes that the reason is that the captive, being a foreigner, does not understand the Greek language (1050–1, 1060–1), and the chorus agree, saying ἑρμηνέως ἔοικεν ἡ ξένη τοροῦ / δεῖσθαι (1062–3). This usage becomes common in prose authors of the fifth century like Gorgias (82b11 D–K = 2.296.8) and Herodotus (1.86.4, 6; 2.125.6 etc.) and of the fourth like Xenophon (*Ana.* 1.2.17, 1.8.8, 5.4.2 etc.) and Plato (*Philebus* 16a3).

(5) Finally, there are two passages in which the ἑρμηνεύς seems to be equivalent to a 'herald'. This is not surprising: heralds too are responsible for transferring meaning in an intelligible form to an addressee from a domain in which it would otherwise be unintelligible to the latter (namely, the sender's context); as we saw above, one of the meanings the Euripides scholia suggest for ἑρμηνεύμα is ἄγγελον (Schol. *Andr.* 46), and one of the Hippocratic authors seems to use διαγγέλλων as a synonym for the participle of the verb (*De morbo sacro* 16.3). I believe that this is the meaning of the word in a highly controversial passage of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*. Clytemnestra has just welcomed with hypocritical joy the herald who has announced the victory of the Greek expedition at Troy; at the conclusion of her speech, the chorus turn to the herald and declare, αὕτη μὲν οὕτως εἶπε μανθάνοντί σοι, / τοροῖσιν ἑρμηνεύσιν εὐπρεπῇ λόγον, 'thus has she spoken to you who understand, a speech quite appropriate for clear messengers' (615–16). τοροῖ ἑρμηνεῖς are heralds who report clearly to the addressee what they have heard: the dative here belongs with εὐπρεπῇ and suggests that the speech Clytemnestra has uttered is the kind of speech which it

<sup>34</sup> For the image, cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 465bff.

<sup>35</sup> The fact that the first chapter of Aristotle's so-called *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* deals with the expression of thought in language is doubtless the reason why the treatise bears this title. Cf. H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern* (Berlin, 1890<sup>2</sup> = Hildesheim, 1961), i.235f.

is appropriate for her to have uttered to such heralds. This is, of course, faint praise: within the narrow limits set to their freedom of speech, the chorus wish to warn the herald, and through him Agamemnon, that things in the palace are not what they seem, yet they dare not say this outright; hence their only recourse is to suggest to the herald that what Clytemnestra has just said is merely the sort of thing that she could have been expected to say under the circumstances, especially as the particular herald to whom she has been speaking is no fool (*μανθάνοντί σοι*).<sup>36</sup> The same meaning is certainly present in one final passage, in a stichomythia of Euripides' *Hercules Furens*, in which Amphitryon's *έρωτᾶς* δ' *ἰᾶθλι* *έρμηνεύματα* corresponds to Herakles' *ὦ κάκ' ἀγγέλλων πάτερ* (*HF* 1136).<sup>37</sup>

This is the evidence for the fifth-century usage of *έρμηνεύς* and related words.<sup>38</sup> Nowhere in this period does it refer to the literary exegete, to the interpreter of difficult poetic discourse. Such a meaning seems not to be attested before Plato, who correlates *οἱ έρμηνεῖς* with *οἱ γραμματισταί* (*Theaet.* 163c2) and who declares in the *Ion* τὸν γὰρ *ῥαψωδὸν έρμηνέα* δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι (530c3–4). Indeed, another passage in this latter dialogue suggests that this 'literary' use of the word is a Platonic metaphor derived from its traditional 'oracular' one and may well be making its first appearance in this very text:

*ΙΩΝ*...καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι θεῖα μοῖρα ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ταῦτα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ έρμηνεύειν.

*ΣΩ*. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς αὖ οἱ ῥαψωδοὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν έρμηνεύετε;

*ΙΩΝ* Καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθές λέγεις.

*ΣΩ*. Οὐκοῦν έρμηνέων έρμηνῆς γίγνεσθε;

*ΙΩΝ* Παντάπασι γέ.

(535a4–10)

If, then, we are obliged to consider the meaning 'exegete' as most unlikely for this passage in the Second Olympian, how should we take *έρμανεῖς*? Although we have lost the contrast between two kinds of audience, the stupid many and the exegetical few, with which we began, we have gained instead a new contrast, one between two aspects of poetic arrows: on the one hand their remaining concealed within Pindar's quiver, on the other their desire for *έρμανεῖς*. There is general agreement that these arrows represent poetic themes or ideas which Pindar has available to him: if we turn to the third meaning listed above, might we not take the *έρμανεῖς* to be people capable of expressing them, of speaking them out loud? This is, indeed, the way Heyne took the passage in the eighteenth century – 'ἐς δὲ τὸ πᾶν, πάντως, έρμηνέων χατίζει, pro έρμηνείας, quae eloquutio est antiquis; verbis, carmine, reddenda sunt illa animi cogitata' is his note on this line,<sup>39</sup> and it still remains one of the most accurate analyses

<sup>36</sup> This is not a traditional interpretation of these lines. Triclinius (ad 616b) glossed *έρμηνεύσιν* as *λόγοις έξηγητικοῖς*; Eduard Fraenkel, ed., *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* (Oxford, 1950), *ad loc.* took it as instrumental with *μανθάνοντί σοι*. The scholars whose interpretations are closest to the one proposed here are Petrus Camper, ed., *Euripidis Electra* (Leiden, 1831), 212, who identifies the *έρμηνεῖς* as heralds; and N. Wecklein, *Aeschylus Orestie mit erklärenden Anmerkungen* (Leipzig, 1888), 74 ad 620f., who reads *εὐπρεπῶς λόγων*, and makes the former word govern *έρμηνεύσιν* and the latter one depend upon it.

<sup>37</sup> So U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, ed., *Euripides, Herakles* (Darmstadt, 1959<sup>4</sup>), *ad loc.*, followed by G. W. Bond, ed., *Euripides, Heracles* (Oxford, 1981), *ad loc.*

<sup>38</sup> So far as I know, I have omitted only two passages of fifth-century literature in which the word appears: Anaxagoras 59A101 D–K, which is obscure and almost certainly corrupt; and Hippocrates *De arte* 13, which is likewise extremely obscure but seems to refer to the doctors who interpret the evidence provided by natural phenomena and hence to fall under the second category discussed above.

<sup>39</sup> See n. 10 above.



of the passage, even though, perhaps because of Boeckh's peremptory dismissal of his view,<sup>40</sup> it has been followed only by Gundert<sup>41</sup> and Perosa<sup>42</sup> among later scholars.

As for the literal meaning underlying Pindar's metaphor, there can be little doubt that Heyne's interpretation is correct. As Wilamowitz<sup>43</sup> and Schadewaldt<sup>44</sup> have shown, the passage from *πολλά μοι* (83) to *εὐκλέας διστοὺς ἰέντες* (90) as a whole is an 'Abbruchsformel', breaking off the mythological account which has culminated in the list of Achilles' victims and permitting a transition to the direct praise of the victorious Theron of Acragas.<sup>45</sup> Pindar begins the *Abbruch* by declaring that he has many poetic themes available he could talk about if he chose to. These themes he calls *ὠκέα βέλη*, a phrase which may well go back ultimately to Homer's *ἔπεα πτερόεντα* but which more immediately forms part of a well-established Pindaric (and general Greek) metaphor of intention as a missile capable of being launched towards a target which denotes the object of the intention;<sup>46</sup> the same metaphor recurs in the last sentence of the passage under consideration here (89–90), thereby closing off the passage as a unit within the larger framework of Pindar's poem. That Pindar has many (*πολλά*) such arrows is a tribute both to his poetic fertility and to the richness of the occasion offered him by his victorious patron;<sup>47</sup> that they are under his shoulder (*ὕπ' ἀγκῶνος*) means that they are readily available to him, that he can seize any of them immediately at will.<sup>48</sup> Their location within his quiver (*ἔνδον ἐντὶ φαρέτρας*) means that they are still merely virtual, that they have not yet been realised by being pronounced out loud<sup>49</sup> – Pindar's quiver, in which the division between inside and outside demarcates the realm of mere possibility from that of actuality, is thus a poetic successor of the Homeric Zeus' twin *πίθοι*, from which he dispenses good and evil to men (*Il.* 24.527), and of the Hesiodic Pandora's casket, from which all ills fly out

<sup>40</sup> A. Boeckh, ed., *Pindari Opera Quae Supersunt. Tomi Secundi Pars Altera. Pindari Epiniorum Interpretatio Latina cum Commentario Perpetuo* (Leipzig, 1821), 133: 'Ἐρμηνεύς nihil hic aliud nisi interpres, nec cum Heynio cogitandum de elocutione sententiarum animo conceptarum verbis et carmine reddenda, quasi hoc sit *tela ex pharetra promere*: id enim poeta dicit, etiam quae tela ex pharetra promiserit, etsi prudentibus clare sonent, in vulgus tamen obscura esse: neque aliter accepit Eustath. ad Dionys. Perieg. Praef. p. VI in Huds. Geogr. min.'

<sup>41</sup> Gundert, op. cit. (n. 11), 55: 'Aber durchaus bedürfen die Pfeile der Dolmetscher', die ihren Sinn auslegen und aussprechen können (wie die *προφᾶται*), und zwar kraft eingeborener Sophia. So lange nun die Pfeile im Köcher, d.h. im Geiste des Dichters (92, 99) sind, bleibt auch ihr Sinn unausgesprochen; wenn aber nun (98ff.) einer von ihnen auf ein bestimmtes Ziel – Akragas und Theron – abgeschossen wird, so ist das die Auslegung, auf die das Ganze zielt...

<sup>42</sup> Perosa, op. cit. (n. 12): 'però tuttavia c'è bisogno, in ogni modo, *assolutamente* (v. 93: *ἐς δὲ τὸ πᾶν*) di un banditore (vv. 93–94: *ἐρμανέων χαρίζει*), di un profeta, che significhi pubblicamente il loro riposto senso'.

<sup>43</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), 247.

<sup>44</sup> Wolfgang Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle, 1928), 312 [= 54].

<sup>45</sup> For parallels and further discussion of this device, cf. Race, op. cit. (n. 9), 256ff. and n. 16.

<sup>46</sup> For examples in Pindar, cf. e.g. *O.* 1.111–12, 9.5–12, 13.93–5; *P.* 1.42–5, 4.213–17; *N.* 7.70–73 (on which see my *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes* [Göttingen, 1985]); *I.* 2.1–5, 5.46–8. On such passages, cf. in general Manfred Bernard, *Pindars Denken in Bildern. Vom Wesen der Metapher* (Pfullingen, 1963), 54ff.; and Simpson, op. cit. (n. 18). I hope to return to the extra-Pindaric Greek metaphor of intentionality as archery in a future article on *καίρος*.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Bundy, op. cit. (n. 19), 12ff.

<sup>48</sup> The suggestion in the scholia that Pindar might be alluding here to the customs of Scythian archers (ad 150b) is rightly rejected by Race, op. cit. (n. 9), 258.

<sup>49</sup> So the scholia ad 150a, c, which identify the quiver with the poet's *διάνοια*. Cf. Bernard, op. cit. (n. 46), 46: 'aus anderen Stellen wissen wir, daß die Phren, das ist wie öfters bei Pindar etwa das schöpferische Organ, als ein tiefes Gefäß vorgestellt wird, aus dem er seine Worte hervorhebt (*N.* 4, 8), oder als ein Köcher, in dem zahllose Pfeile geborgen sind (*O.* 2, 84).'

to be realised, but only hope remains within as perpetually unfulfillable (*Works and Days*, 90-104).<sup>50</sup> And the claim that these arrows all have a voice for the wise (*φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν*) means that any one of them would be an entirely acceptable theme to be chosen for expression: *συνετός*, both in Pindar and elsewhere in archaic Greek literature, often refers to the poet's listeners, either to his patron in particular as a man of discriminating taste or, more generally, to the audience as people who will understand and approve his poetry;<sup>51</sup> here it denotes the circle of possible recipients of such poetic themes, including but by no means restricted to Theron himself,<sup>52</sup> and flatters them (by praising their intelligence) at the same time as it carefully preserves the poet's distance from them (for it is not they who decide which theme is to be spoken out loud).<sup>53</sup>

Viewed in this light, the crucial sentence, *ἐς δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἔρμανέων / χατίζει*, must mean, 'And they all crave people to express them out loud'. *δέ*, of course, need not be adversative, but can be merely connective.<sup>54</sup> *χατίζει*, which is usually translated objectively as 'needs, stands in need of',<sup>55</sup> in fact tends in archaic Greek to have the more subjective meaning 'wants, craves, desires':<sup>56</sup> not only do these thought-arrows require people to express them, they also crave such people: here, as elsewhere, Pindar speaks of the themes of poetry thirsting for or otherwise desiring expression.<sup>57</sup> Who then are the *ἐρμανεῖς*? Not literary exegetes among the audience, but instead the poets themselves, who *ἐρμηνεύουσι*, express out loud, these poetic themes.

This view of the passage not only takes better account of the meanings of the individual words than the traditional one; it also yields a more coherent sequence of thought. For, as was observed earlier, the traditional interpretation results in an awkward shift from one contrast, between types of audiences, to another, between types of poets.<sup>58</sup> Some critics, indeed, have taken the very awkwardness their own

<sup>50</sup> On this last, cf. especially Hermann Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens. Literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Studien*, ed. Franz Tietze (Munich, 1960<sup>2</sup>), 329-34, and *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums. Eine Geschichte der griechischen Epik, Lyrik und Prosa bis zur Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1962), 130-1.

<sup>51</sup> Pindar: *N.* 7.60; and for *συνήμι* cf. *P.* 3.80, *N.* 4.31, *Fr.* 105.1. Elsewhere: Bacch. 3.85; Evenus 1.5 West; Apollodorus 1.1 Meineke; Eubulus, *Sphingocariai* 1.3 Meineke = 107.3 Kock = 107.3 Edmonds; Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 10.29. So too frequently for *συνήμι*: *Il.* 1.273, 2.26, 63, 24.133; *Od.* 1.271, 4.76, 15.391, 19.38; Hes. *Theog.* 831; Archil. 109.1 West; Theognis 1240, 1284, 1306; Strato, *Phoenicides* 1.3, 41 Edmonds.

<sup>52</sup> Yet so e.g. G. Fraccaroli, *Le Odi di Pindaro* (Verona, 1894), 201, and Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* (n. 43), 247. A related misunderstanding connects the usage of the word here with the language of the mysteries; so e.g. C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford, 1964), 122.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Race, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 261-2, though his suggestion that the word here might be 'slightly ironic' seems fanciful.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Slater, *op. cit.* (n. 18), s.v. *δέ* 2.

<sup>55</sup> Slater, *ibid.*, s.v. translates the word as 'lack, need'; Rumpel, *op. cit.* (n. 27), s.v. as 'indigeo, opus est'. This misunderstanding leads Race, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 266 n. 24, to offer as alleged parallels three passages in which the verbs are *προσδεῖται*, *δεῖται*, and *egeat*.

<sup>56</sup> So in almost all its archaic usages: *Il.* 18.392; *Od.* 8.156, 11.350, 22.50, 351; Hes. *Op.* 21, *Fr.* 43a.41; Eur. *Her.* 465. In only two passages is it clearly objective in meaning (*Il.* 17.221; Hes. *Op.* 394); in one final passage (*Il.* 2.225) it is unclear which alternative is to be preferred.

<sup>57</sup> So especially *N.* 3.6-7 (on which cf. J. B. Bury, *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* [London, 1890 = Amsterdam, 1965], *ad loc.*); and cf. e.g. *P.* 9.104, *N.* 1.12.

<sup>58</sup> Boeckh's comment (*op. cit.* [n. 40]) is typical: 'Iam quum multam sese carminis materiam habere dixerit, non arte hanc sibi paratam esse affirmat, sed natura; quod cur addiderit nescio: nisi forte ipsi obiectum erat, quod nimium in elocutione brevis arte careret neque satis disertus esset, volebatque in calumniatores retorquere reprehensionem, qui non natura sed arte poetae inania multa garrent...'

misinterpretation has invented as a symptom which betrays to them Pindar's psychological disposition. So for example Bowra:

Sometimes, however, Pindar takes advantage of a transition to create an unexpected effect, and the result is surprising if not disturbing. After finishing his account of the after-world in *Olympian* 2 he must get back to personal matters. He tells Theron that he has many swift arrows in his quiver that 'speak to the wise', and indicates that he could say much more on these high matters which are beyond the reach of the vulgar (83–6), but come to him by nature. Then, in violent contrast, he attacks the people who have the impertinence to compete with him, the divine bird of Zeus (86–8). The abrupt, even brutal change of tone comes with a shock, and we may feel that Pindar has allowed personal animosity to run away with him.<sup>59</sup>

Now it is perfectly true that Pindar goes on, in lines 86ff., to contrast the man who knows much by nature (σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φύᾳ) with those who have merely learned all their knowledge (μαθόντες); and the immediately following bird simile, in which the latter are figured as garrulous crows that scream in vain (λάβροι / παγγλωσσία κόρακες ὡς ἄκραντα γαρύετον) while the former seems to be represented by the divine bird of Zeus (Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον) against whom they are compared unfavourably,<sup>60</sup> does seem to make it practically certain that we are to understand Pindar as an example of the former kind of person and other poets as examples of the latter.<sup>61</sup> Hence there is indeed a contrast between Pindar and lesser poets; but so far from contrasting with the immediately preceding sentence, it continues it directly, for the naturally wise poet and those who have merely learned are simply two kinds of ἔρμανεῖς. All the poetic arrows demand people to express them: some of these people are wise by nature; others have to depend upon learning. The former are clearly superior, and it is to these that Pindar obviously belongs: hence his way of expressing the arrows, his choice of which themes to realise, will be the best. Having announced his own superiority in choice of theme, Pindar then goes on, in the immediately following sentence, to urge himself to demonstrate it: he tells himself to aim his bow now at the target, to choose the best possible available poetic theme (ἔπεχε νῦν σκοπῶ τόξον, ἄγε θυμέ), and then goes on to praise that theme, Theron of Acragas.

Another passage in Pindar offers an exact parallel for both the imagery and the function of these lines, so understood; the scholia connect it with them,<sup>62</sup> but it seems not to have been fully exploited by modern scholars for their interpretation.<sup>63</sup> In the Fifth Isthmian, Pindar concludes an extensive mythical catalogue of the many legendary heroes of Aegina with the words,

<sup>59</sup> Bowra, *op. cit.* (n. 52), 341.

<sup>60</sup> Most scholars take πρὸς here to mean 'against': so e.g. the scholia (ad 154c, 157a); Boeckh, *op. cit.* (n. 40), after considerable hesitation; Slater, *op. cit.* (n. 18), s.v. πρὸς l.b.a. But it seems preferable to understand it in a purely comparative sense: so Schol. Rec. 139.16–17 ad 156–9 Abel; A. de Jongh, *Pindari carmina Olympia. Cum annotatione critica, interpretatione latina et commentario* (Traiecti ad Rhenum, 1865), 316–17, who compares Hdt. 3.34[4], Soph. *Ant.* 1170[1171]; and cf. Richard Jebb, ed., *Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments. Part III. The Antigone* (Cambridge, 1906), *ad loc.*, and Aristot. *Phys.* 1.1[184b1]; F. Mezger, ed., *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig, 1880), 166; and Race, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 260. Nothing in the simile suggests hostility on the part of the crows towards the eagle (γάρῳ conveys no hint of antagonism in Pindar's language; it merely means 'sing'). It is enough for the image that the lesser poets be like crows in comparison to the eagle, i.e. be inferior to him: to add to the objective comparison the extraneous notion of subjective antagonism merely confuses matters. Theocritus 7.47–8 seems to have misunderstood this passage in a typically Alexandrian way, in terms of rivalry among competing poets.

<sup>61</sup> So Schol. ad 157a, Schol. Rec. 139.7–8 ad 159, 13–16 ad 156–9 Abel.

<sup>62</sup> So Schol. ad *I.* 5.58, Schol. Rec. 436.18–19 ad *I.* 5.58 Abel.

<sup>63</sup> Thus Race, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 257, refers to this passage, but only to illustrate the *Abbruch*.

πολλὰ μὲν ἀρτιεπὴς  
 γλωσσά μοι τοξεύματ' ἔχει περὶ κείνων  
 κελαδέσαι· καὶ νῦν ἐν Ἄρει μαρτυρήσαι  
 κεν πόλις Αἴαντος ὀρθωθείσα ναύταις  
 ἐν πολυφθόρῳ Σαλαμὶς Διὸς ὄμβρῳ  
 ἀναρίθμῳ ἀνδρῶν χαλαζάεντι φόνῳ.  
 ἀλλ' ὅμως καύχασμα κατὰβρεχε σιγᾷ·  
 Ζεὺς τὰ τε καὶ τὰ νέμει,  
 Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος. ἐν δ' ἐρατεινῷ  
 μέλιτι καὶ τοιαίδε τιμαὶ καλλίνικον  
 χάρμ' ἀγαπάζοντι. μαρνάσθω {δέ} τις ἔρδων  
 ἀμφ' ἀέθλοισιν γενεὰν Κλεονίκου  
 ἐκμαθών· (I. 5.46–56)

Here too the arrows (τοξεύματα) his tongue has to sing about heroic valour are possible poetic themes; with the reference to Salamis, Pindar starts in fact to actualise one of them. But to do so at any length would be to stray too far from the theme in hand, the praise of the victorious Phylacidas. Hence those other themes, attractive though they are, must be suppressed: instead of being spoken out, they are kept silent (ἀλλ' ὅμως καύχασμα κατὰβρεχε σιγᾷ), this time with the unexceptionable justification that success and failure alike are really in the hands of Zeus (and hence too much praise would invite divine φθόνος); therewith Pindar can return to the victorious athlete. Though the justifications given for the *Abbruch* vary from one passage to the other, there can be no doubt that they are both in fact *Abbrüche* – nor that the τοξεύματα which Pindar here must καταβρέχειν σιγᾷ are parallel to the βέλη of the Second Olympian which ἐρμανέων χατίζει.

It seems, then, that this interpretation is superior to the traditional one as an explanation of the literal content of the passage. But I would like to propose that, on the level of the figures of speech, the actual metaphor Pindar uses is slightly different; and that, even if the resulting literal meaning is practically identical with the one just examined, the difference in the figure itself is enough to warrant consideration. Pindar's allusion to the divine bird of Zeus introduces into this passage the language of auspices and prodigies, those monitory expressions whereby divine will is communicated to humans; and if we may see a reference to himself in that allusion, then it will be Pindar himself who will be conveying that divine message to mortals. Elsewhere Pindar calls himself an αἰοίδιμος Πιειρίδων προφάτας (*Paeon* 6.6); proudly asserts ἐμὲ δ' ἐξαίρετον / κάρυκα σοφῶν ἐπέων / Μοῖσ' ἀνέστασ' Ἑλλάδι καλλιχόρῳ (*Dith.* 2.23–5); bids the Muse μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ' ἐγώ (*Fr.* 150).<sup>64</sup> Indeed, even Bacchylides calls himself a Μουσᾶν ἰοβλεφάρων θεῖος προφάτας (9.3). Is it not most likely that here too in the Second Olympian Pindar is referring to poets not so much as ordinary people who merely express their thoughts out loud (the third meaning of ἐρμηνεύς discussed above), but instead as divinely sanctioned announcers of the holy oracles provided to them by the Muses (the first meaning)?

<sup>64</sup> For various aspects of the poet as προφήτης, see especially J. Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax* (Basel, 1928<sup>2</sup>), ii.239–40, who says of this word, 'der Begriff des Heraussagens und öffentlich Bekanntgebens liegt ihm zu Grunde'. Cf. also J. Duchemin, *Pindare: poète et prophète* (Paris, 1955); Giuseppe Fabbri, 'Gli oracoli come fonte d'ispirazione nella letteratura poetica dei Greci', *A&R* N.S. 11 (1930), 25–82 (Pindar: 35–46); O. Falter, *Der Dichter und sein Gott bei den Griechen und Römern* (Diss. Würzburg, 1934), 20–29; F. Schwenn, *Der junge Pindar* (Berlin, 1940), 82f.; Alice Spurduti, 'The divine nature of poetry in antiquity', *TAPhA* 81 (1950), 209–40 (Pindar: 233–7).

If the argument presented here is accepted, then, this passage will be translated along the following lines:

I have many swift arrows under my arm in my quiver that speak to those with understanding, and they thoroughly crave oracular announcers. Wise is that announcer who knows many things by nature; but those who have only learned speak out futilities like many-tongued vociferous crows in comparison to the divine bird of Zeus. Now then, spirit, come, aim your bow at the target: whom are we shooting at, casting forth arrows that provide good repute from a well-disposed mind?

*Princeton University*

GLENN W. MOST